In 1992, before Bill Clinton became “our first black president,” before Newt Gingrich’s “Republican revolution,” before the advent of Barack Obama, I wrote a book about how race had come to dominate American politics.
I argued that the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
set in motion a realignment of the two parties. As whites began to feel the costs of the civil rights revolution — affirmative action, busing, urban violence — Republicans recognized the potential of race to catalytically interact with the broader rights revolution and the anti-tax movement to drive working and middle class voters out of the Democratic Party.
I also wrote about the political power of racial resentment:
Race gave new strength to themes that in the past had been secondary — themes always present in American politics, but which previously lacked, in themselves, mobilizing power. Race was central, Richard Nixon and key Republican strategists began to recognize, to the fundamental conservative strategy of establishing a new, noneconomic polarization of the electorate, a polarization isolating a liberal, activist, culturally permissive, rights-oriented and pro-black Democratic Party against those unwilling to pay the financial and social costs of this reconfigured social order.
The situation hasn’t changed much.
Heading into the 2020 election, President Trump is prepared for the second time in a row to run a racist campaign. He continues, for example, to denigrate, in virulent terms, immigrants from Mexico and Central America.
At the same time, Democrats are doubling down on a racially liberal political agenda, becoming more outspoken and more confrontational in their defense of diversity and multiculturalism. Two of the party’s top-tier candidates for president — Senator Cory Booker and Senator Kamala Harris — are African-American, one — Julián Castro — is Latino, and all of the current Democratic contenders unabashedly promote the rights of racial and ethnic minorities.
The continuing Democratic quandary is how to maximize essential minority turnout, and at the same time retain — or recruit — sufficient numbers of white working class voters to secure victory on Election Day.
My Times colleagues Jonathan Martin and Alexander Burns reported on Feb. 25 that Democratic operatives are debating whether the party should spend “time, money and psychic energy tailoring their message to a heavily white, rural and blue-collar part of the country” or focus instead on areas where “their coalition is increasingly made up of racial minorities and suburbanites.”
The dispute, according to Martin and Burns,
is not merely a tactical one — it goes to the heart of how Democrats envision themselves becoming a majority party. The question is whether that is accomplished through a focus on kitchen-table topics like health care and jobs, aimed at winning moderates and disaffected Trump voters, or by unapologetically elevating matters of race and identity, such as immigration, to mobilize young people and minorities with new fervor.
Poll data suggests that Trump is driving Democratic liberals further left and conservative Republicans further right on a key test of racial attitudes.
Michael Tesler, a political scientist at the University of California-Irvine and the author of the 2016 book “Post Racial or Most Racial,” writes in “Racial Attitudes and American Politics,” a chapter in a forthcoming book:
Democratic and Republican voters do not simply disagree about what the government should do on racially charged issues like immigration and affirmative action, they now inhabit increasingly separate realities about race in America.
The growing alignment between racial attitudes and public opinion, Tesler continues, “has polarized the electorate and helped make American politics increasingly vitriolic.”
Racial attitudes have, in turn, become indelibly linked to partisan identification and “party identification influences just about everything in contemporary American society,” Tesler writes:
Partisanship is not only the most important determinant of our vote choices and policy preferences, but it shapes countless other beliefs and behaviors. Party identification has even been linked to who we find attractive and who we decide to marry, how we perceive objective conditions like the unemployment rate and federal budget deficit, which neighborhoods we want to live in, and the type of TV shows and cars we like.
Because of this, Tesler argues, “the racialization of party identification is by itself the racialization of American politics and society.”
Ryan Enos, a Harvard political scientist notes that
The pull of racial attitudes seems to be moving both directions — so that racial conservatives are being drawn into the GOP and racial liberals are being drawn into the Democratic Party.
Political ideology, Enos continued in an email,
is a broad orientation that is influenced by basic psychological traits and these traits orient a person toward a particular worldview that can be ideologically conservative or liberal and also causes one to be more or less ethnocentric.
The growing linkage between ideological and ethnocentric views has, in turn, contributed to a striking development in congressional elections.
Stephen M. Utych, a political scientist at Boise State University, conducted a detailed analysis — “Man Bites Blue Dog: Are Moderates Really More Electable than Ideologues?” — of winners and losers in House races from 1980 to 2012.
Utych found that a core premise of both political operatives and political scientists — that “moderate candidates should be more electable in a general election than ideologically extreme candidates” — is no longer true.
In fact, in 2012, ideologically extreme candidates became more electable than moderates, as the accompanying graphic shows.
In 1980, at the start of the period Utych studied,
moderates were quite likely to win — very extreme candidates were less than 20 percent likely to win election in 1980, while ideologically moderate candidates were nearly 80 percent likely to win.
By 2008, however, Ultych observes,
ideologically extreme candidates and moderates became indistinguishable in their likelihood of winning an election, with predicted probabilities of winning hovering around 50 percent for both.
In an email, Utych pointed out that racial views are extremely significant in the trends he describes:
The importance of racial attitudes, and how intertwined with politics they’ve become, can go a long way to explaining polarization.
Tesler and many other academics use a set of polling questions to determine the intensity of what they call “racial resentment.” Whites who score high in racial resentment have consistently voted in higher percentages for Republican presidential candidates.
“From 1988 to 2012 average white resentment scores were very stable, but in 2016 something quite notable happened,” Tesler explained by email. Referring to data from American National Election Studies, Tesler pointed out that
White resentment was significantly lower in 2016 than had ever been recorded in the ANES. It’s not just the ANES or resentment, either. Across several surveys and attitudes, the country has grown significantly more liberal on several questions related to race, immigration, Islam and gender since Trump’s campaign.
The shift to the left was not, however, across the board. It was driven by one group: Democrats and voters who lean toward the Democratic Party.
“This growing tolerance is largely confined to Democrats and Democratic leaning Independents,” Tesler wrote, adding that
Democrats have grown more tolerant as a backlash against Trumpism. It also means that while the country is growing more tolerant, they’re also more polarized over race and ethnicity.
The accompanying graphic, based on data provided by Tesler, demonstrates the growing partisan division over race, in this case showing levels of agreement with the statement “racial discrimination is the main reason why many black people can’t get ahead these days.”
From 2008 through 2016, very few Republicans agree, and their disagreement remains constant. Democratic agreement, in contrast, shot up, from just over a quarter to well over half.
Tesler argues that racially resentful voters turned against Obama in higher percentages than in past elections when the Democratic nominee was white, but Obama made up for his losses with higher turnout and stronger margins of victory among blacks and white liberals. Tesler calls this phenomenon “two sides of racialization”:
Obama performed particularly poorly among racially resentful whites, but garnered more votes from African Americans and white racial liberals than a similarly situated white Democratic candidate.
Instead of costing him votes, Tesler continued, the
large effects of racial attitudes in Obama’s election, therefore, did not so much hurt him electorally as they polarized voter preferences based on their feelings about African-Americans.
In 2016, even though both presidential candidates were white, race played an even larger role than it did in the two Obama elections.
That year, Tesler wrote,
the American public saw a much wider gulf between Clinton and Trump’s positions on issues like immigration and federal aid to African Americans than they had perceived between prior Democratic and Republican presidential candidates.
That, in turn, set the stage for
attitudes about race and ethnicity to matter more in 2016 than they had in modern times. Across several different racial attitude measures in a number of different surveys, views about race and ethnicity were more strongly related to vote choice in 2016 than they were in Obama’s elections.
On Feb. 19, Gallup reported that the liberal faction of the Democratic Party is growing:
Increased liberal identification has been particularly pronounced among non-Hispanic white Democrats, rising 20 percentage points from an average 34 percent in the early 2000s to 54 percent in the latest period. By contrast, Gallup trends show a nine-point rise in the percent liberal among Hispanic Democrats, from 29 percent to 38 percent, and an eight-point increase among black Democrats, from 25 percent to 33 percent.
Lydia Saad, a senior editor at Gallup, provided additional survey data showing a marked leftward trend among white Democrats during and after the election of President Trump. The percentage of white Democrats who describe themselves as “socially liberal” grew from 39 percent in 2001 to 2006 to 50 percent in 2007 to 2012 and to 63 percent in 2013 to 2018, according to Gallup. This 24-point increase outpaced black Democrats, who went from 33 to 41 percent, and Hispanic Democrats who went from 28 to 36 percent. (Of course, the percentage of white voters who identify as Democrats is much lower than it is for African-America or Hispanic voters.)
The Gallup data showed similar leftward shifts among white Democrats on taxing the rich, abortion, gay rights and a wide range of other issues.
Not only has the Trump presidency pushed Democrats in a progressive direction, Trump himself has played a crucial role in maintaining Democratic unity, according to Gallup:
The Democrats’ grand unifier stands outside the party. Despite differing ideologies and opposing views on some issues, on average last year, 82 percent of conservative Democrats, 91 percent of moderate Democrats and 96 percent of liberal Democrats disapproved of the job President Donald Trump was doing as president.
As they prepare for the general election, Democrats battling for the nomination (and their strategists) will struggle to understand how and where their increasingly strong commitment to racial and cultural liberalism conflicts with the views of the general electorate.
This week, for example, the Pew Research Center released a study showing that 73 percent of Americans oppose racial and ethnic affirmative action policies in college admissions. Pew reported that 7 percent of those surveyed said race should be a major factor, while 19 percent said it should be a minor factor.
Similarly, Democratic strategists will be evaluating the issue of reparations, which three major candidates — Kamala Harris, Elizabeth Warren and Julián Castro — have endorsed so far, in various forms.
In 2015, CNN and the Kaiser Family Foundation polled Americans’ view of reparations and found that while African Americans were in favor (52-42), Hispanics (at 57-37), and whites (89-8), were firmly against.
In “The Distorting Effects of Racial Animus on Proximity Voting in the 2016 Elections,” Carlos Algara and Isaac Hale, political scientists at the University of California at Davis, show how powerful race has become in mobilizing support for Republicans: “Not only did Trump’s frequent invocations of race in the 2016 campaign prime voters with high levels of racial animus to evaluate the presidential contest in racial terms,” they write, but the increased salience of race in the 2016 campaign “percolated to relatively low-information congressional contests as well.”
The result, Algara and Hale show, is that voters liberal on issues other than race defect “to Republican candidates up and down the ticket when they harbor racial animus.” Racial animosity, they write, hurts both black and white Democratic candidates: “Racial animus (at least when salient) harms Democratic candidates across the board.”
I began this column with a pair of quotes from my 1992 book, “Chain Reaction.” Here is another pair:
As the civil rights movement became national, as it became clearly associated with the Democratic Party, and as it began to impinge on local neighborhoods and schools, it served to crack the Democratic loyalties of key white voters. Crucial numbers of voters — in the white, urban and suburban neighborhoods of the North, and across the South — were, in addition, deeply angered and distressed by aspects of the rights revolution. It had been among the white working and lower-middle classes that many of the social changes stemming from the introduction of new rights — civil rights for minorities, reproductive and workplace rights for women, constitutional protections for the criminally accused, immigration opportunities for those from developing countries, free-speech rights to pornographers, and the surfacing of highly visible homosexual communities — have been most deeply resisted.
And from the book’s conclusion:
At stake is the American experiment itself, endangered by a rising tide of political cynicism and alienation, and basic uncertainties as to whether or not we are capable of transmitting a sense of inclusion and shared citizenship across an immense and diverse population — whether or not we can uphold our traditional commitment to the possibilities of justice and equality expressed in our founding documents and embedded in our most valued democratic institutions.
The question stands out even more starkly now than it did 27 years ago, with a president we could not then have imagined, who is willing, even eager, to play with fire.
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【如】【题】，【这】【书】【太】【监】【了】。 【从】【葫】【芦】【开】【书】【的】【时】【候】，【就】【在】【担】【心】【的】【事】【儿】，【成】【为】【了】【事】【实】。【以】【前】【葫】【芦】【还】【觉】【得】【可】【以】【抢】【救】【一】【下】，【奈】【何】，【军】【工】，【这】【是】【离】【不】【开】【国】【家】【的】。【当】【然】，【原】【本】【葫】【芦】【以】【为】【写】【科】【技】【发】【展】，【就】【能】【避】【开】【雷】【区】，【但】【是】【那】【样】【一】【来】，【就】【成】【了】【本】【书】【前】【面】【的】【状】【况】。 【太】【多】【的】【雷】【区】，【不】【能】【碰】，【加】【上】【很】【多】【情】【节】，《【军】【工】【子】【弟】》【里】【面】【也】【写】【了】，【再】【写】【就】
【刘】【宸】【这】【天】【闲】【来】【无】【事】，【回】【去】【大】【雪】【山】【游】【玩】，【发】【现】【韩】【落】【石】【正】【在】【捣】【乱】，【梅】【可】【菁】【逃】【走】【了】。 【二】【人】【大】【战】【一】【场】，【刘】【宸】【发】【现】【韩】【落】【石】【的】【武】【功】【大】【有】【长】【进】，【一】【时】【不】【备】，【被】【打】【落】【悬】【崖】。 【半】【空】【中】，【他】【掉】【进】【一】【个】【奇】【怪】【的】【地】【方】，【到】【处】【都】【是】【巨】【大】【的】【铁】【家】【伙】，【也】【不】【知】【道】【是】【啥】。 【铁】【家】【伙】【有】【两】【个】【人】【那】【么】【高】，【刘】【宸】【轻】【易】【地】【钻】【了】【进】【去】，【屁】【股】【做】【下】【去】【之】【后】，【竟】【然】
“【三】【哥】，【至】【于】【吗】？” 【她】【暗】【淡】【地】【垂】【下】【眼】【眸】，【房】【间】【里】【那】【个】【女】【人】【又】【不】【是】【什】【么】【重】【点】【保】【护】【对】【象】，【至】【于】【这】【么】【严】【防】【死】【守】【的】【吗】？ 【叶】【轻】【浔】【给】【了】【她】【一】【个】【更】【为】【疑】【惑】【的】【眼】【神】。 【莫】【秋】【研】【干】【脆】【打】【开】【天】【窗】【说】【亮】【话】，“【你】【若】【不】【是】【防】【着】【我】，【又】【怎】【会】【将】【屋】【外】【的】【视】【线】【完】【全】【挡】【住】？” 【反】【正】，【不】【管】【三】【哥】【怎】【么】【解】【释】，【她】【都】【不】【会】【相】【信】——【他】【对】【她】【没】【有】【一】【点】【防】管家婆网络版服务器硬盘坏了【今】【夜】【格】【外】【寂】【静】，【晚】【归】【的】【寒】【鸦】【顶】【着】【烟】【雪】，【簌】【簌】【而】【行】，【不】【见】【悲】【啼】，【不】【见】【振】【翅】，【只】【余】【一】【道】【雪】【线】，【于】【那】【塞】【北】【荒】【原】【间】，【风】【光】【旖】【旎】。 【尚】【未】【来】【得】【及】【黄】【透】【的】【柳】【叶】，【和】【已】【深】【红】【犹】【血】【的】【枫】【林】，【于】【那】【飒】【飒】【扬】【扬】【的】【絮】【雪】【纷】【飞】【中】，【矗】【立】【如】【两】【方】【美】【景】，【黄】【的】【如】【冬】【日】【初】【升】【的】【旭】【日】【朝】【阳】，【红】【的】【似】【腊】【月】【傍】【晚】【时】【分】【殷】【红】【如】【血】【的】【一】【抹】【残】【阳】【晚】【照】，【黄】【的】【绝】【世】，【红】【的】
【云】【凰】【他】【们】【感】【觉】【到】【众】【人】【那】【好】【奇】【打】【量】【的】【目】【光】，【云】【凰】【他】【们】【面】【面】【相】【觑】。【有】【些】【尴】【尬】【啊】！【不】【过】【他】【们】【有】【没】【有】【太】【注】【意】【那】【些】【目】【光】。 【云】【凰】【看】【了】【一】【眼】【君】【无】【殇】。【耸】【耸】【肩】，【也】【没】【说】【什】【么】。 “【唉】【唉】!【我】【好】【像】【看】【到】【了】【一】【个】【熟】【人】【啊】！“【火】【倾】【晴】【目】【光】【看】【着】【某】【处】，【有】【些】【惊】【讶】【的】【情】【绪】。 “【什】【么】【熟】【人】【啊】！“【叶】【非】【夜】【好】【奇】【的】【问】【道】。 “【你】【们】【自】【己】【看】【啊】！“
【短】【时】【间】【找】【不】【到】【相】【关】【的】【狐】【狸】，【林】【虎】【也】【没】【办】【法】，【只】【能】【留】【意】【着】【这】【件】【事】【情】。 【月】【狐】【形】【态】【最】【近】【也】【没】【法】【用】。 【因】【为】【肉】【身】【能】【力】【实】【在】【是】【太】【弱】【了】，【不】【过】【林】【虎】【看】【过】【天】【狐】【大】【佬】【发】【威】，【九】【根】【尾】【巴】，【可】【以】【同】【时】【动】【用】【九】【种】【术】【法】，【非】【常】【的】【离】【谱】。 【而】【且】【九】【根】【尾】【巴】【可】【以】【联】【合】【起】【来】，【凝】【聚】【大】【招】。 【自】【己】【虽】【然】【只】【有】【三】【根】【尾】【巴】，【但】【料】【想】【也】【不】【会】【差】【了】，【晚】【点】【去】